Tag Archives: Free Expression

Turning back that Crimson Tide

Originally posted 2009-11-03 13:50:30. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Trademark law does not trump the right to make and sell artistic depictions of real life after all, it turns out.  Or even NCAA football.

Almost exactly four years ago I wrote about the suit by the University of Alabama urging the obnoxious claim that artistic depictions of its players at play were, by virtue of utilization of the familiar uniforms and colors of those players, infringements of the Alabama trademarks in its corporate sports machine.  Amazingly, the first judicial ruling in that case has just come out — and, blessedly, it gets it right (even if the Tuscaloosa News reporting of it is a little, er, sic):

U.S. District Court Judge Robert Propst said in an opinion that Moore did not violate trademark laws by painting scenes of Crimson Tide football without licensing the work through the university. He rejected UA’s argument that the football team’s uniform and colors are iconic enough to trump First Amendment rights in fine art.

‘This court concludes that the depiction of the uniforms in the paintings is incidental to the purpose and expression of the paintings; that is, to artistically depict and preserve notable football plays in the history of University of Alabama football,’ Propst wrote in his memorandum opinion.

UA attorneys had argued before Propst in a hearing two weeks ago that Moore’s paintings showed trade dress, which they said is any symbol associated with UA, including the crimson and white color scheme.UA sued Moore for trademark violations in March 2005, alleging that he painted scenes of Crimson Tide football games without permission from the university and reissued previously licensed prints without paying royalties. The university is seeking back pay [sic] for more than 20 paintings and wants Moore to license any future paintings. . . .

Propst knocks down nearly every claim made by UA attorneys against Moore, even writing that Moore did not violate previous licensing agreements with new or reissued paintings. At the center of the issue, Propst dismisses UA’s assertion that painting Crimson Tide football violates [sic] trademark because the uniforms and their colors are not protected.

Also, UA argued that Moore’s paintings were too realistic and did not transform the original scene enough to constitute artistic expression. However, Propst writes the reality of the painting is needed to relate the play and adds to the level of artistry.

Propst also writes there isn’t enough confusion among customers as to who sponsors the paintings. ‘It is likely that people who buy the Moore paintings do so, at least partially, because of their loyalty to the University of Alabama and its football team,’ he wrote. ‘That, however, does not create any reasonable inference that they do so because of confusion based on the color of the uniforms.’

The whole opinion is here.

There will be no end to the greed or the attempt to utterly distort the entire purpose of trademark here — this will be appealed, it has been promised.  In the Eleventh Circuit (as everywhere else), “To show a likelihood of success on the merits for [either a] trademark and trade dress infringement, [a plaintiff] must show that consumers will likely confuse the [plaintiff's] mark or dress with [the junior user's product or service]. See Carnival Brand Seafood Co. v. Carnival Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (trademark); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 146 L. Ed. 2d 182, 120 S. Ct. 1339,1343 (2000) (trade dress).”  So what’s the argument — the public will think that the paintings are the Crimson Tide’s latest run defense?

Of course, consumer confusion is never, ever seriously considered in naked rent-seeking cases such as these — Read More…

Revisiting the Black List

Originally posted 2006-03-07 13:14:43. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

David Bernstein writes:

[Northwestern Law Prof Martin] Redish concludes, and this Reviewer agrees, it was entirely appropriate — under the First Amendment, and also morally — for businesses and individuals to boycott members of the Stalinist CPUSA.

(SKIP PARAGRAPH IF YOU DON’T CARE ABOUT LAW SCHOOL POLITICS. ) Marty Redish wrote that? Very impressive for its political incorrectness. Maybe he’s hankering to follow (one of my other first-year NU Law professors — took Redish’s course on federal jurisdiction, too, which really paid off…) Dan Polsby, also recently getting attention on the Volokh blog, to George Mason Law. Interesting NU / George Mason thing going on here — what with Bernstein’s article appearing the NU Law Review…. (Ugh. I should leave this stuff to Brian Leiter.)

But really, I highly recommend the link, assuming that like everyone else you don’t read law review articles. Everything you thought about the “Red Scare,” pretty much, was wrong (unless you’re the type who reads this blog regularly, I guess). And the fact that a mainstream First Amendment authority such as Redish will write that this was an issue of moral choice, not “stifling of dissent,” is a very good development.

Defacing “The Face”?

Originally posted 2010-05-27 23:50:36. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Genius!  Plus studliness!

Yes, in one post on his Licensing Law Blog, Richard Bergovoy brings together some of my favorite things:

What do Jimi Hendrix, Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe, and Princess Diana all have in common?

If you guessed that all of them are dead celebrities, you are only half right.

More importantly, all of them were subjects of messy postmortem lawsuits against sellers of celebrity-branded goods.

Because of great variations in the laws, as well as “favorite son/daughter” influence on local courts, using the name or image of a dead celebrity to sell products without a license is risky business.

Doing so may put a businessperson in violation of two categories of legal rights, rights of publicity laws and trademark laws.

The more direct threat is the law of rights of publicity. Generally speaking, rights of publicity laws prohibit the commercial use of the name (and usually image and signature) of another person without his permission. But that is about all one can say with certainty — the laws are state-based, not federal, and beyond the basics, there are great variations in the laws of the states that recognize rights of publicity. In fact, it is not even certain how many states do recognize rights of publicity, with estimates ranging from the mid-20’s to close to 50.

One of the biggest variables among state laws is whether the right of publicity survives the celebrity’s death, and if so, for how long. States that characterize the right of publicity as a personal right naturally conclude that it is extinguished on the person’s death. New York is one such state. States that characterize the right of publicity as a property right, like New Jersey, naturally conclude that it survives the person’s death, and is descendible to her survivors.

That seems simple enough. So where is the problem? Read More…

Second class on the First Amendment

Originally posted 2009-04-06 08:38:10. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

The Administration believes bloggers can’t be trusted with free speech the way everyone else is, it seems.  Reports FT.com (hat tip to Marco):

Advertisers in the US are bracing themselves for regulatory changes that they fear will curtail their efforts to tap into the fast-growing online social media phenomenon.

Revised guidelines on endorsements and testimonials by the Federal Trade Commission, now under review and expected to be adopted, would hold companies liable for untruthful statements made by bloggers and users of social networking sites who receive samples of their products.

Bad, bad idea.  I definitively (!) addressed this two years ago right  here.  Nothing else to talk about.

Blogger anonymity upheld against John Doe defamation claims

Originally posted 2006-05-28 09:59:40. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

The defendant-appellant, John Doe No.1, anonymously posted allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff-appellee, Cahill, on an internet blog. Cahill brought a defamation action. Seeking to serve process on Doe, Cahill sought to compel the disclosure of his identity from a third party that had the information. A Superior Court judge applied a good faith standard to test the plaintiff’s complaint and ordered the third party to disclose Doe’s identity. Doe appeals from the Superior Court’s order. Because the trial judge applied a standard insufficiently protective of Doe’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously, we reverse that judgment.

The decision in John Doe v. Cahill from the Delaware Supreme Court is here. This is the trend: Appellate courts are not permitting “John Doe” defamation actions to be their own justification. These rulings prevent plaintiffs to merely file a flimsy complaint and get quick discovery from ISP’s so plaintiffs can learn the identity of bloggers and others on the Internet who are virtually never actually committing legally actionable defamation — but who are critics the plaintiff would like identified.

Courts are not making it impossible for bona fide plaintiffs to get discovery to which they’re normally entitled. But igot-gouzenko-hoodedthey are requiring, in cases like these, that plaintiffs make a legal showing of their bona fides up front,which is eminently reasonable considering how meritless most defamation actions are.

It doesn’t do me, as a defendant, any good to win a motion to dismiss if the main thing you, as a plaintiff and the subject of my criticism, already have what you want — my identity — and are now free to get me fired, cut off from my suppliers, or shunned, as the case may be. It also removes some of the burden on defendants, who are usually financially worse off in these situations, from having to hire attorneys to quash subpoenas served on ISP’s, much less to make appearances on behalf of anonymous parties. This is a good trend.

UPDATE: More, similar news from California.

Best of 2013: Turning back that Crimson Tide

Originally posted 2009-11-03 13:50:30. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Originally published January 8, 2013

Trademark law does not trump the right to make and sell artistic depictions of real life after all, it turns out.  Or even NCAA football.

Almost exactly four years ago I wrote about the suit by the University of Alabama urging the obnoxious claim that artistic depictions of its players at play were, by virtue of utilization of the familiar uniforms and colors of those players, infringements of the Alabama trademarks in its corporate sports machine.  Amazingly, the first judicial ruling in that case has just come out — and, blessedly, it gets it right (even if the Tuscaloosa News reporting of it is a little, er, sic):

U.S. District Court Judge Robert Propst said in an opinion that Moore did not violate trademark laws by painting scenes of Crimson Tide football without licensing the work through the university. He rejected UA’s argument that the football team’s uniform and colors are iconic enough to trump First Amendment rights in fine art.

‘This court concludes that the depiction of the uniforms in the paintings is incidental to the purpose and expression of the paintings; that is, to artistically depict and preserve notable football plays in the history of University of Alabama football,’ Propst wrote in his memorandum opinion.

UA attorneys had argued before Propst in a hearing two weeks ago that Moore’s paintings showed trade dress, which they said is any symbol associated with UA, including the crimson and white color scheme.UA sued Moore for trademark violations in March 2005, alleging that he painted scenes of Crimson Tide football games without permission from the university and reissued previously licensed prints without paying royalties. The university is seeking back pay [sic] for more than 20 paintings and wants Moore to license any future paintings. . . .

Propst knocks down nearly every claim made by UA attorneys against Moore, even writing that Moore did not violate previous licensing agreements with new or reissued paintings. At the center of the issue, Propst dismisses UA’s assertion that painting Crimson Tide football violates [sic] trademark because the uniforms and their colors are not protected.

Also, UA argued that Moore’s paintings were too realistic and did not transform the original scene enough to constitute artistic expression. However, Propst writes the reality of the painting is needed to relate the play and adds to the level of artistry.

Propst also writes there isn’t enough confusion among customers as to who sponsors the paintings. ‘It is likely that people who buy the Moore paintings do so, at least partially, because of their loyalty to the University of Alabama and its football team,’ he wrote. ‘That, however, does not create any reasonable inference that they do so because of confusion based on the color of the uniforms.’

The whole opinion is here.

There will be no end to the greed or the attempt to utterly distort the entire purpose of trademark here — this will be appealed, it has been promised.  In the Eleventh Circuit (as everywhere else), “To show a likelihood of success on the merits for [either a] trademark and trade dress infringement, [a plaintiff] must show that consumers will likely confuse the [plaintiff's] mark or dress with [the junior user's product or service]. See Carnival Brand Seafood Co. v. Carnival Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (trademark); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 146 L. Ed. 2d 182, 120 S. Ct. 1339,1343 (2000) (trade dress).”  So what’s the argument — the public will think that the paintings are the Crimson Tide’s latest run defense?

Of course, consumer confusion is never, ever seriously considered in naked rent-seeking cases such as these — Read More…

Jews for Jesus v. Google and Brodsky – update and analysis

Originally posted 2006-01-22 12:59:35. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Jews for Jesus

I was on a panel called “Trademark Rights vs. Free Speech” at the Fall 2000 INTA Trademarks in Cyberspace Conference with Marty Schwimmer and David Bernstein. (Five years later I’m still glowing from the reflected brilliance!) The moderator was IP superstar Brendan O’Rourke, who cruelly, on-the-record, and correctly reminded me, “Ron, you lost the Jews for Jesus case, okay? Okay?” Yeah, well, okay. But that doesn’t mean the next guy–in this case, Google–has to! The “Jews for Jesus Whistle Blower” writes, at his Jews for Jesus blog:

Google has a few more days to respond to Jews for Jesus’ lawsuit over the rights to a blog. I bet Jews for Jesus is praying ferverently (and keeping their collective fingers crossed) that Google will give in. What is the likelihood that Google will set a precedent that all anyone has to do is sue Google and they’ll give in? Seems to me that Google is principled. And if they are willing to defend themselves against the government, there’s a good chance they’ll defend themselves against Jews for Jesus.

If Google doesn’t give in, will Jews for Jesus wilt? How much money do they have to pursue the control of a simple blog?

WB, they have plenty of money, and, as you cannily point out, they’re using this litigation to raise more. Jews for Jesus claimed (off the record) during the Brodsky litigation to have raised more in sympathetic donations than they spent on Thelen Reid’s legal fees. We’ll never know if that was true, but it’s food for thought.

As far as the “other side” went, although Steve Brodsky was the sole defendant and there was nothing but the most casual (well, and virtual) link between him and Rabbi Toviah Singer, certainly the two were aligned sympathetically. Rabbi Singer later told me that as a result of the controversy and the traffic that was generated as a result of the publicity for his website, a number of Messianic Jews (i.e., Christians with gefilte fish) returned to the Jewish fold. Maybe he was able to raise a dollar or too himself.

It is fair enough to say that the litigation was more helpful for J4J than it was for either Steve Brodsky, Rabbi singer or anti-J4J missionaries. The real loser, of course, was the law of trademark infringement, which still has not fully recovered. The most egregious aspect of J4J’s arguments on this point (as opposed to the even worse arguments–such as the cooked up “commercial use”–in the opinion) is the very premise that there is, with respect to these website cases, anything even approximating LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION.

As we put it in the Third Circuit brief which, among others, future Supreme Court justice Samuel Alito by all indications did not read (although he was on the panel that rubber-stamped the District Court decision with one sentence of affirmation):

Liability under the Lanham Act requires a showing, inter alia, of likelihood of confusion as to source. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978). But, appellee has submitted no admissible proof to support a finding that confusion is likely.
. . .

[I]t takes virtually no time for even self-described “unsophisticated” users to quickly realize they are at Mr. Brodsky’s site, not that of appellee. The honesty of the non-confusing message on Mr. Brodsky’s website is in stark contrast to the defendant’s website in Planned Parenthood:

Because the words on the top of the page load first, the user is first greeted solely with the “Welcome to the Planned Parenthood Page!” It is highly likely that an Internet user will still believe that she has found plaintiff’s web site at that point.

42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1438. That kind of confusion is simply impossible in the case of Mr. Brodsky’s website . . . In response to this argument, the District Court found that an individual may be a sophisticated consumer of the Internet but may be an unsophisticated consumer of information about religious organizations. Such a user may find his or her way to the Defendant Internet site and then be confused; the Defendant Internet site advocates views antithetical to those of the Plaintiff Organization.

The last two clauses in the excerpt above constitute a non-sequitur. They also make no sense in the context of the actual website at issue, which explicitly states its opposition to “the Jews for Jesus cult” and disclaims any affiliation with appellee. Concluding that Mr. Brodsky is not part of a Jews for Jesus organization does not require any particular “sophistication.” It only requires the ability to read.

In fact, the courts routinely define “sophistication” in much less “sophisticated” terms than did the court below, where a simple grasp of the obvious is all that is required to negate confusion. Thus, in Girls Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court ruled that “rational analysis” precluded confusion about whether the Girl Scouts were the source of a poster depicting a pregnant girl in the well-known uniform of the Girl Scouts appearing with the caveat “BE PREPARED.” Similarly, in Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, supra, 489 F. Supp. at 1123, a poster reading “Stop the Olympic Prison” was held not to violate the trademark of the United States Olympic Committee. The court reasoned as follows:

On the basis of its own examination of the poster, the Court finds it extremely unlikely that anyone would presume it to have been produced, sponsored or in any way authorized by the U.S.O.C. While at a fleeting glance, someone might conceivably mistake it for a poster advertising the Olympics, nobody could conceivably retain such a misconception long enough to do any harm: for example, there is no danger that anyone would purchase or display it as such.

Id. . . .  As in Girl Scouts and Olympic Prison, no rational person could believe that Mr. Brodsky’s message was in any way affiliated with appellee. The District Court nonetheless held that confusion is likely because Mr. Brodsky’s site is “related” to that of appellee [and that the use of the trademark was in fact more, not less, protected for this reason, on fair use grounds!-- RDC]. The court below inexplicably rejected the inescapable conclusion that consumers can dispel any confusion if they merely trouble to read Mr. Brodsky’s message, the way Chellathurai, Kalstein and Sanchez did.

If you’re still with me, here’s a last nail from the Third Circuit reply brief:

In defending the District Court’s likelihood of confusion analysis, appellee comes again to its prized exhibits: the three “confusion affidavits” of Chellathurai, Kalstein and Sanchez. There is little left to debate regarding whether these affidavits demonstrate confusion, or, more likely, the absence of confusion. This Court will simply have to read them. A076, A080, A257. Appellee suggests that the District Court found “initial interest confusion” here. Opp. Brief. at 37. But this doctrine is mentioned nowhere in the opinion below. Developed in a sales context, it has been applied only where “a potential purchaser is initially confused [such that] the [senior seller] may be precluded from further consideration.”

Weiss Assoc., Inc. v. HRL Assoc., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Thus it does not apply here. In fact, in Girl Scouts the Southern District of New York rejected transient confusion as proof of trademark harm in a social-commentary context:

Even if we hypothesize that some viewers might at first believe that the subject of the poster is actually a pregnant Girl Scout, it is highly doubtful that any such impression would be more than momentary or that any viewer would conclude that the Girl Scouts had printed or distributed the poster.

304 F. Supp. at 1231. As the Girl Scouts court recognized, ephemeral moments of confusion that do not threaten to divert sales are not evidence of actionable harm under the Lanham Act. Real harm must be shown to overcome the constitutional protection of free speech:

No evidence is found anywhere in the record before the court that the poster has to date damaged the plaintiff in any way. No facts are presented to show that contributions to the organization have fallen off, that members have resigned, that recruits have failed to join, that sales . . . have decreased, or that voluntary workers have dissociated themselves or declined to support the honorable work of the organization.

Id. at 1235. Similarly, there is no evidence in this case of any actionable or even discernible harm that appellee has suffered as a result of Mr. Brodsky’s website. Even the court below admitted that the publicity surrounding this dispute was, far from harmful, undoubtedly a boon for appellee. A436-37. And all three supposedly confused affiants found their way to appellee’s website, undeterred by Steven Brodsky and more zealous than ever in their devotion to appellee. In fact, their reports to appellee negate the suggestion of confusion; again from Girl Scouts:

[I]ndignation is not confusion. To the contrary, the indignation of those who [reported the offending use] would appear to make it clear that they feel that the Girl Scouts are being unfairly put upon, not that the Girl Scouts are the manufacturers or distributors of the object of indignation.

Id. at 1231. This passage perfectly describes the three “confusion” affidavits here: indignant, yes, but certain that appellee was not the source of Mr. Brodsky’s website. They were not confused.

They were not confused. Unfortunately, a lot of people were, and are–about what the Lanham Act is, and is not, meant to protect, and don’t get this key point:  Indignation is not confusion. We can survive that, as long as too many of them aren’t judges.

It’s a good bet, as Whistle Blower suggests, that Google will get a better hearing than lone idealist Steve Brodsky did in his case, and not just because it is better heeled. (My old firm, Pitney Hardin, handled the Brodsky litigation pro bono.) And the issues are somewhat different.

Still, Whistle Blower says that the Reverend David Brickner, the pleasant, non-Jewish head of Jews for Jesus, thinks this is the second coming of the Brodsky case. Jews for Jesus attorneys Thelen Reid probably hope so (though perhaps not every Thelen Ried partner is singing from the same sheet of music on the topic of God and intellectual property). WB beleives that from a legal point of view this seems like somewhat wishful thinking. (Not to mention the fact that this case was filed in the federal court in New York, not New Jersey, and that Judge Lechner of the former court has retired and moved onto bigger and better things.)

Then again, the Rev. Brickner’s statement is hardly the first instance of wishful confusion to eminate from the the precincts of Jews for Jesus–not hardly.

Urban Smear

Originally posted 2006-01-03 12:39:59. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

We’ve blogged on graffiti before. Wordsmith to the stars Jane Genova reports on a little commercial free speech applied a bit too freely — as in, on other people’s walls:

Seems Sony contracted with local graffiti artists to plaster urban space in seven cities with caricatures of children playing with video toys. The ads don’t carry any product names or the Sony brand name. The strategy was to simulate street art to deliver a commercial message about the fun of video products.

What Sony might have considered edgy and out there the city of Philadelphia as well as anti-graffiti organizations, for instance, considered out of line and against the law. Sony had not applied for the mandatory licensing and zone approval. Unofficially signs are being defaced and there could be official fines and other legal action. In New York, street folks have covered over the Sony “ad” with stickers saying “Corporate vandals not welcome.”

What the heck, they’ve been vandalizing the music industry for this long, anyway — what’s a few placards at this point?

Ideological purity

Originally posted 2007-01-24 16:18:46. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Yahoo News:

Chinese Communist Party chief Hu Jintao has vowed to “purify” the Internet, state media reported on Wednesday, describing a top-level meeting that discussed ways to master the countrys sprawling, unruly online population. . . .

Hu, a strait-laced communist with little sympathy for cultural relaxation, did not directly mention censorship.

But he made it clear that the Communist Party was looking to ensure it keeps control of China’s Internet users, often more interested in salacious pictures, bloodthirsty games and political scandal than Marxist lessons.

Don’t kid yourself: This could be a very big deal. China can’t be competitive as anything other than a source of slave labor if it shuts down the Internet, Cuba-style — and it wants to be. On the other hand, its leaders do not want to cede political control along with economic control, which history has proved to be a very difficult task.

Incidentally, I take the stated concern with morality, as understood by the bourgeois among us — “We must promote civilized running and use of the Internet and purify the Internet environment” — at face value. It’s not an illegitimate concern, issues of power apart. The Internet is, or perhaps more accurately encompasses many things including, a moral cesspool. Free societies have by and large surrendered to this risk, preferring the very real risk of social harm to what they regard as the intolerable cost of censorship. How China goes about making its way on this issue, regardless of our view of it, will be objectively interesting and will matter beyond the borders of Middle Earth.

UPDATE: I chose the graphic even though there was no specific Google angle to this. But now there is.  And, of course, more here.


From “homage” to “infringement”

Originally posted 2010-01-18 23:27:22. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

I’m not so doctrinaire:  Sometimes a press release is actually worth posting:

For more than thirty years, as hip-hop evolved from the urban streets of New York to its current status as a multibillion dollar industry, hip-hop performers and producers have been re-using portions of previously recorded music in new, otherwise original compositions. But when lawyers and record companies got involved, what was once referred to as a “borrowed melody” became a “copyright infringement.”

COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS, a new film by Benjamin Franzen and Kembrew McLeod, will air on the PBS series Independent Lens January 19 (check local listings).

COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS showcases many of hip-hop’s founding figures like Public Enemy, De La Soul and Digital Underground, along with emerging artists such as audiovisual remixers Eclectic Method.  It also provides an in-depth look at artists who have been sampled, such as Clyde Stubblefield (James Brown’s drummer and the world’s most sampled musician), as well as commentary by another highly sampled musician, funk legend George Clinton.

Computers, mobile phones, and other interactive technologies are changing our relationship with media, blurring the line between producer and consumer, and radically changing what it means to be creative. As artists find ever more inventive ways to insert old influences into new material, the film asks a critical question: can anyone really own a sound?

The trailer’s here.  Why, if I had a TV, I just might watch this!

What can I tell you?  These guys are playing my song.

So to speak.

Talking a leak

Originally posted 2006-01-12 19:24:54. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Want to know the difference between a leaker and whistle-blower? Johnny Dollar posits the distinction.

Bloggers, Journalists, Reporting and Privilege

The New York State Bar Association’s Bright Ideas journal (Vol. 22, No. 2) 17 (Fall 2013) has just published my essay about shield laws entitled, Bloggers, Journalists, Reporting and Privilege.  And now you can read it.

[ This is the article as it was republished in the New York State Bar Association Journal.  It was also subsequently republished in 31 Computer & Internet Lawyer 9 (March 2014).]


UPDATE: The case reported in this article in the New York Law Journal (registration required) raises a question I didn’t at all address in this article, but wish I had:  The extent to which one state’s press shield law (in this case, New York’s) protects a journalist from revealing her sources in another state (Colorado).  Frankly, it’s inconceivable to me that Colorado courts should be bound by a decision made in Albany regarding the extent of shield protection to be awarded journalists on the ground that they are “New York-based” — which, essentially, the reporter’s lawyer is arguing that all journalists are.

Is that an argument for a uniform federal standard?  If you like these laws, perhaps it is, though I’m not sure exactly what constitutional basis there would be to hamstring state courts’ powers through such a statute.