Tag Archives: Trials

U.S. District of Arizona: “No automatic injunction upon a finding of copyright infringement”

Originally posted 2008-09-05 17:38:37. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Not that the plaintiffs in the Designer Skin case didn’t get an injunction:  They did (here it is); a narrow one utilizing proposed language by defendants explicitly permitting S&L to use its own photographs of Designer Skin merchandise on its website (see the prior post).  But the Court ruled that they were not entitled to it merely by virtue of proving copyright infringement.  Here’s an excerpt from the opinion, discussing the point:

The parties dispute the law governing the issuance of a permanent injunction in a copyright-infringement case. Relying on MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993), Designer Skin argues that “a permanent injunction [should] be granted in a copyright infringement case when liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing violations.”  Conversely, S & L Vitamins argues that the MAI rule has been overruled by the recent Supreme Court opinion in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), and that the traditional four-factor test reaffirmed by eBay applies.

MAI’s general rule may accurately describe the result of applying the four-factor test to a copyright-infringement case in which liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing violations. Nevertheless, as Judge Wilson persuasively demonstrated in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1209-10 (C.D. Cal. 2007), this general rule, as a rule, is clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay. Thus, for the reasons given by Judge White in Grokster, Designer Skin’s reliance on this pre-eBay rule is unavailing, and the Court will apply the traditional four-factor test. . . .

This is an important holding, making the District of Arizona among the handful of earliest courts to apply the rule of eBay to copyright infringement.  After the jump, you can see how the court did apply it to one particular factor of interest, the need for a plaintiff seeking an injunction to prove irreparable harm.  The court agreed with S&L that past infringement does not lead to a presumption of future infringement. Unfortunately, to our client’s (nominal) detriment, and despite our argument that, seeing as how Designer Skin enunciated no coherent description of harm it suffered by the infringement — and that, in fact, it probably benefited from it — an injunction should not issue, the court found that there was irreparable harm, for reasons best expressed in its own words. Read More…

Some intel on INTEL®

Originally posted 2010-04-07 03:15:14. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

CIA Headquarters - intel inside

There's intel inside.

BUMPED from January 1, 2010 and UPDATED due to decision (scroll to the bottom for the stunning conclusion):

Had you heard about this one from Mike Masnick?

Chip giant Intel has a bit of a reputation for being a trademark bully at times, threatening or suing many companies just for having “intel” in their name somewhere — including a travel agency and a jeans company. Now, before anyone brings it up, yes, as a trademark holder the law requires you to enforce your trademark against infringement, lest it become considered “generic” (such as xerox machines, kleenex tissues, aspirin and other brand names that became generic).  But, the key in all of those generic situations was that the use was applied to things that directly competed with the original brand’s products. People referred to other tissues as “kleenex” and it stuck. Intel’s lawyers seem to go out of their way to find potential infringement where there obviously is none at all.

Paul Alan Levy alerts us to the latest such case, where Intel has sued the operators of the Mexico Watch newsletter, because its domain is LatinIntel.com. Of course, the reason for that is that it is using the commonly accepted abbreviation of “intel” as short for “intelligence.” It’s common shorthand, especially within government circles, to refer to gathered intelligence as simply “intel.” . . .

More importantly, no one is going to look at LatinIntel.com and confuse it for the world’s largest computer chip maker. No one is going to look at that site and wonder how come they can’t order a Centrino processor. There’s simply no confusion at all. . . .

Well, when I first read that post, I thought Mike may just be on to something there. Here’s how I see it now:

UPDATE:  Intel loses (don’t get excited about the “decision” itself however!)

Yay us!

Glory and gratitude to my co-counsel Colby Springer who nailed it at oral argument.

MORE:  Is less.

Fat lady sings: Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law in Designer Skin v S & L Vitamins

Originally posted 2008-09-05 17:01:27. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

The District of Arizona ruled today in a case we defended through trial and have reported on here extensively.  The decision is here; the minute entry on the electronic docket reads as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW – that S & L Vitamins has infringed Designer Skin’s copyrights in the electronic renderings of the 42 products styled [by various brand names] and that Designer Skin is entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining S & L Vitamins from any such future infringement of these copyrights;

FURTHER ORDERED that S & L Vitamins has not infringed Designer Skin’s copyrights in the electronic renderings of the 12 products styled [by various brand names];

FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall bear its own costs in this matter.

Signed by Judge James A Teilborg

No attorneys’ fees for either side.  The injunction reads as follows (per the minute entry); prefatory language is omitted and emphasis is added:

FINAL JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION in favor of Designer Skin, LLC against S&L Vitamins, Inc. . . . S & L Vitamins . . . are hereby immediately and permanently ENJOINED from publicly displaying, using, copying, or otherwise infringing Designer Skin’s copyrights in these electronic renderings for any purpose whatsoever. Nothing herein, however, shall be construed to enjoin S & L Vitamins from taking, using, or displaying original photographs of the physical Products themselves in connection with S & L Vitamins’ sale of the Products on the internet.

Signed by Judge James A Teilborg

Interested persons may wish to ponder how, and to what extent, the Court addressed the issues framed by the counsel for the respective parties, including identification of what indeed are “Designer Skin’s copyrights in [its] electronic renderings,” by considering the proposed findings and facts and conclusions of law submitted by the plaintiffs, and by the defendants, respectively.

For practitioners interested in the law of injunctions, the most interesting part of the decision concerns the court’s application of the rule in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) that there is no automatic entitlement to an injunction upon a finding of infringement to a copyright infringement case.  We have made a separate post addressing that part of the decision.

S&L’s website is here, by the way.  Buy Designer Skin lotion from S&L!  It’s the way both sides pay their lawyers!

Where you stand depends on where you sit

Originally posted 2009-12-28 09:00:50. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

I’ve never had a guest post in response to a LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION® item before, but that’s only because no one with the stature to respond to something I’ve written here based on personal knowledge of the facts has ever had the nerve to ask for one — not until I entered the rock and roll world of the fascinating Ritchie Fliegler, that is.  Ritchie’s a marketing guy, not a lawyer, so, naturally, he’s not afraid to speak truth to, uh, whatever it is this thing we have here is.Here’s what I would love to be able to say is the first of many replies to a LOC blog post from someone with a different point of view, and in a position to know. — RDC

 

“Where you stand depends on where you sit” – Nelson Mandela

This is one of my favorite quotes.  Not only does it ring true on so many levels, it’s also easier to understand than Einstein’s theory of relativity, which says basically the same thing —“Two events, simultaneous for some observer, may not be simultaneous for another observer if the observers are in relative motion.”

What does this have to do with trademark law? Not much actually, but it has a lot to do with a spirited and interesting conversation I had recently, with Ron.

Like many of you, my Google alerts are set to tick off on a number of subjects near and dear to me, classic cars, family members, former employers and the like. A few days ago the Google light went off alerting me to a blog post about a former employer, Fender Musical Instruments Corporation (FMIC) and their failed attempt to register trademarks for their famous guitar-body shapes – Strat, Tele and P-Bass. The article was well written, and thoughtful, however, in a vortex of relativity that would do ol’ Albert proud, my blood started to boil at what I perceived as purposeful errors and omissions by an uninformed outsider.

Now, I have been away from FMIC for well over two years, but I still have many dear friends at the place as well as a lingering vested interest… so I sprung in to action and sent a message with a requisite level of rancor. Read More…

Litigation is war!

Originally posted 2010-11-16 15:57:48. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Old Passaic County courthouse

With apologies to Fred Whitmer… great day today, going in person to file a verified complaint in a commercial case in New Jersey Superior Court.  If you’ve never waddled up to the clerk’s counter and handed over your papers to a human person and watched that pleading get stamped, well, it’s just not the same as what you’re doing now.  If you really loved the law, you would do this for me.

It gives a person joie de vivre, you know?

Either you can relate, or you can’t, I guess.

Side by side comparison doesn’t decide likelihood of confusion

Originally posted 2006-07-11 17:14:18. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Dooney & Bourke's pattern

This is an important decision: The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has partially reversed the earlier ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (full decision here) in Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc.

Here’s the “money quote” as a once-great blogger taught me to say (citations and internal quotes omitted; link added) :

We turn next to the question of likelihood of confusion. . . . The similarity of the marks is a key factor in determining likelihood of confusion. To apply this factor, courts must analyze the mark’s overall impression on a consumer, considering the context in which the marks are displayed and the totality of factors that could cause confusion among prospective purchasers.’ The district court here noted that there were “obvious similarities” between the Louis Vuitton and Dooney & Bourke handbags. However, it determined that despite the similarities, the two marks were not confusingly similar. It appears the trial court made the same mistake that we crioticized in [the] Burlington Coat Factory [decision]: inappropriately focusing on the similarity of the marks in a side-by-side comparison instead of when viewed sequentially in the context of the marketplace. The district court reasoned:

[I]t could not be more obvious that Louis Vuitton uses the initials “LV,” while Dooney & Bourke uses its trademarked “DB” logo. Thus, a consumer seeing these trademarks printed on these bags, either up close or at a distance, is not likely to be confused. . . . [T]he Dooney & Bourke bags only use their “DB” initials; there are no geometric shapes interspersed with the monogram. . . . [T]he colors used on the Dooney & Bourke bag are noticeably toned down, and consequently fail to evoke the characteristic “friction” sparked by Murakami’s bright, clashing colors, the Louis Vuitton marks create a very different overall impression (i.e., large interspersed shapes and initials in crisp, bold colors) than the Dooney & Bourke bags (i.e., tightly interlocked initials in dulled colors).

Vuitton's pattern


We disapproved almost identical language in Burlington Coat Factory. Utilizing a side-by-side comparison can be a useful heuristic means of investigating similarities and differences in respective designs, so long as a court maintains a focus on the ultimate issue of the likelihood of consumer confusion. Courts should keep in mind that in this context the law requires only confusing similarity, not identity. Further, where, as here, the plaintiff claims initial-interest and post-sale confusion, market conditions must be examined closely to see whether the differences between the marks are likely to be memorable enough to dispel confusion on serial viewing. The district court erred because it based its determination that confusion between the Vuitton and Dooney & Bourke marks was unlikely at least in part on an overemphasized side-by-side comparison. This is suggested by the district court’s comment that no amount of expert opinion, legal analysis, or demonstrative evidence can overcome the clarity that comes from direct observation.

Read that excerpt again, then re-read it; then email it to your favorite federal judge — and your favorite client or prospective client, or non-specialist lawyer dabbling in trademark, who can’t understand why the PTO doesn’t understand the difference between his spelling that uses a “z” and the other guy’s pre-existing registration that uses an “s”.  Again:

Courts should keep in mind that in this context the law requires only confusing similarity, not identity. Further, where, as here, the plaintiff claims initial-interest and post-sale confusion, market conditions must be examined closely to see whether the differences between the marks are likely to be memorable enough to dispel confusion on serial viewing.

Got it? Read More…

Bratz, foiled again! (Bumped and updated)

Originally posted 2010-07-23 11:10:54. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

First, December’s 15, 2009’s story:

Remember the Bratz dolls case, and the phenomenal legal fees application that followed?

It’s back!   The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the trial judge’s order basically liquidating the Bratz.  Here’s what the WSJ Law Blog reported last week:

The Ninth Circuit on Wednesday ruled that Bratz maker MGA Entertainment can continue selling its dolls, despite the stinging defeat it suffered last year a jury when a Riverside, Calif., jury awarded Mattel, Inc. $100 million in damages in a closely followed copyright-infringement lawsuit. . . .

The judges on the appellate panel, Alex Kozinski, Kim Wardlaw and Stephen Trott, questioned whether the trial judge went too far by awarding MGA’s Bratz doll franchise to Mattel and wondered why he didn’t instead award Mattel a royalty or ownership stake in the company.

I never played with dolls due to a household manliness mandate, and I’m already uncomfortable blogging about this for the fourth time, so let’s just note it and go back to what I was doing with this here mitre box and also I’m going to do some re-grouting on some tiles somewhere before bed.  Which I sleep in wearing a rustic burnoose emblazoned with my varsity letter. With the windows open.

Bratz-tip to Jaded Topaz!

UPDATE:  In response to certain inquiries, a clarification:  No, I did not actually earn a varsity letter in high school or otherwise.   But the one on my night-burnoose is “mine.”  It’s a kind of … trophy I took from the still-quivering hulk of the middle-linebacker I brutally beat up and left for dead in a Chicago alley, okay?

Now, today’s update:

No surprise here in light of the earlier ruling, but stunning nonetheless:  The Ninth Circuit kayos the award!  Choice quote — Kozinski, of course — via Bloomberg:

Even assuming that MGA took some ideas wrongfully, it added tremendous value by turning the ideas into products and, eventually, a popular and highly profitable brand.  It is not equitable to transfer this billion-dollar brand, the value of which is overwhelmingly the result of MGA’s legitimate efforts, because it may have started with two misappropriated names.

That’s going to ruin a lot of Big IP summers on Cape Cod this weekend.

UPDATE:  For Mattel, it only gets worse:

[Today a] U.S. jury decided that MGA Entertainment Inc is the rightful owner of the once-billion dollar line of pouty-lipped Bratz dolls.

The astonishing loss for the world’s largest toy maker concluded a case that began in 2004, when MGA’s line of dolls was all the rage among teen and preteen girls. Mattel accused Van Nuys, California-based MGA of stealing its designs by hiring away a key employee.

Mattel CEO Robert Eckert sat stone-faced, staring straight ahead as the verdict was read on Thursday in a Santa Ana, California, federal courtroom. He said afterward that he was disappointed by the verdict.

“We remain committed to protecting the intellectual property that is at the heart of business success,” Eckert said in an email.

What?  MGA’s intellectual property?

The opinion’s here.

Bringing big IP plaintiffs down a peg — or two

Originally posted 2007-06-01 01:13:36. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Mike Atkins is paying attention to Microsoft’s IP docket, as a Seattle Trademark Lawyer will do. He’s reporting about a default judgment and award the software maker achieved in California, with a rather surprising anticlimax in the dollars-and-cents category:

Microsoft sought more than $3 million in statutory damages. However, the court only awarded $12,500 in damages and $2,000 in fees and costs. The court explained its decision by stating: “Plaintiff asks for the maximum enhanced statutory damages for the infringement of each of seven copyrights and two trademarks. At $150,000 per copyright and $1,000,000 per counterfeit trademark, the tab comes to $2,050,000. Plaintiff has identified a grand total of three units of counterfeit software that defendant sold. It is true that Microsoft could not conduct discovery to determine its damages, but that in itself does not support levying a statutory damages award in excess of three million dollars. … Statutory damages are intended to serve as a deterrent, but that does not justify such a windfall.

Well. True enough, when we got the judgment for seven (theoretical) figures in Louis Vuitton v. Veit, which was a counterfeiting case (and thus also implicated statutory damages), we could point to a major online counterfeiting operation, from which the court could deduce not only massive sales but the sort of massive wrongdoing that those huge swinging statutory damage options are meant to punish. Even then the court wanted as much proof as we could get our hands on of what was going on there.

But only $2,000 in fees and costs? That doesn’t sound right. The attorneys’ fees provisions of the Copyright Act are supposed to make a successful plaintiff at least whole in terms of the cost of enforcement — regardless of the number of units sold. Two thousand dollars doesn’t even cover scribes and sealing wax.

Sounds like something else was going on here. Any suggestions?

Diversion, yes, but no

Originally posted 2009-11-26 08:30:51. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Some people have all the luck in the Eastern District of New York.  Whereas me — I think I’ve got it coming to me right down the middle, and then it seems to get, I don’t know — diverted from me!

So some lawyers get assigned judges in the Eastern District of New York whose ideas about trademark law and, well, the Federal Rules of Evidence — and, actually, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have, well, um . . . okay, I won’t say.  But in their courtrooms this is the kind of thing happens to “unauthorized resellers,” regardless of the actual “law” stuff.

RDC BIG BEARDI know, regular readers are sick of hearing about the S&L case, but I’m just framing the story here, okay?  Stick with me.

And then there are other judges in that same court who actually not only get it, but really, really, really get it:  There’s no such thing as “diversion” of authentic, untainted merchandise by “unauthorized” resale on the Internet.  Whether or not the manufacuter of a product thinks you need a whole two years of community college or that certificate from beauty school to slather on hair goop or tanning sludge, that preference does not “run with” the over-hyped blech they sell.

So — still setting the stage here, stay with me! — Judge Leonard Wexler, in 2007, went this far to make that point, as reported here exactly two year agos from tomorrow:

L’Oréal maintains that to keep the value, integrity and status of the products, they are supposed to be sold only by company-trained professionals in fashionable salons. Matrix alone “has been the number one professional hair brand on the market, with an estimated 16 percent market share,” L’Oréal said in court papers.

Quality King and Pro’s Choice, however, were obtaining the products in violation of the injunction by buying them, or, as it is called, diverting them, from middlemen and reselling them to nonqualified dealers, L’Oréal contended.

Diverting attention

Diverting attention

In his opinion, Wexler declined to enforce the old injunction, in effect, throwing out L’Oréal’s case against the two companies.

The judge said that if L’Oréal wanted seriously “to stop diversion of Matrix products,” it could terminate those of its distributors who are the sources of the diverted products.

He actually declined to enforce the old injunction, did Judge Wexler, because it would have actually been, well, wrong to!  Because of the law stuff.

Isn’t that enough mazal for Quality King?  Can’t some other lawyers in other courtrooms in that District have some of that good fortune?

No!  Evidently, on appeal of the earlier decision, the Second Circuit affirmed his vacatur (cancellation) of the injunction going forward, but remanded for further determination of whether the injunction should be not only — not “only”! — vacated, but also “terminated,” i.e., retroactively time-traveled into non-ever-existence.

So once more comes Matrix, the plaintiff, and with them this time big guns from the collossal Weil Gotshal, a real New York law firm this time.  So, was it a good idea to spend a good 50% more on fees (not to mention their markup on donuts!) to make the same arguments? Read More…

Designer Skin v. S&L Vitamins trial update

Originally posted 2008-07-17 11:39:17. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

The remaining issues in the case, you may recall, were copyright infringement and Arizona unfair competition. Here is the status per this morning’s minute entry in the court’s electronic case filing docket:

Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Judge James A Teilborg on 7/16/2008: Jury Trial – Day 2 held. Plaintiff’s case continues. Evidence and testimony presented. Plaintiff rests. Defendant rests. The Court grants defendant’s oral Rule 50 Motion as to statutory damages, actual damages and unfair competition claim. The Court grants defendant’s oral Rule 50 motion to dismiss defendant Lawrence Sagarin as a defendant. The remaining issue in the case is the injunction issue. Closing arguments. Jury deliberations. Jury to return at 9:00 a.m. 7/17/2008 to resume deliberations. (Court Reporter David German.) (TLB )

A tad terse and bloodless — quite unlike how trial has gone.  Not terse or bloodless at all.  [UPDATE:  Here's the transcript.  Dismissal of the damages claims were stipulated; see the ruling from the bench at page 124 of the PDF for the ruling as to Sagarin.]

“The Court grants defendant’s oral Rule 50 Motion as to statutory damages, actual damages and unfair competition claim” means “The Court grants defendant’s’ oral motion to dismiss Designer Skin’s claims for statutory damages, actual damages and unfair competition. (Earlier on the court declined to take our “suggestion” of a lack of copyright jurisdiction.)

So, so far: No damages, no plaintiff attorneys’ fees in play. Jury (advisory per Rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; injunction against further use of Designer Skin’s “electronic renderings” is not a jury issue, but they are charged with deciding whether there was copyright infringement) is out; they return this morning, Phoenix time, at 9.

We will update and backfill…

UPDATE: The jury returned a verdict of infringement on 42 of the 54 copyrights. In post-verdict interviews, interestingly, the jurors reported they would have awarded no damages, or nominal damages, had the judge permitted them to consider damages. (Per the above the damages claims were dismissed.) The jurors rejected the idea that a manufacturer is entitled to damages in connection with the sale by third parties of merchandise the manufacturer already sold once before, regardless of the legal theory. This came as quite a surprise to the plaintiff’s legal team, whereas the advisory verdict of infringement (which the court indicated he would adopt) was not particularly surprising to us… considering.

RELATED POST: Two Cities.

Blogger anonymity upheld against John Doe defamation claims

Originally posted 2006-05-28 09:59:40. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

The defendant-appellant, John Doe No.1, anonymously posted allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff-appellee, Cahill, on an internet blog. Cahill brought a defamation action. Seeking to serve process on Doe, Cahill sought to compel the disclosure of his identity from a third party that had the information. A Superior Court judge applied a good faith standard to test the plaintiff’s complaint and ordered the third party to disclose Doe’s identity. Doe appeals from the Superior Court’s order. Because the trial judge applied a standard insufficiently protective of Doe’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously, we reverse that judgment.

The decision in John Doe v. Cahill from the Delaware Supreme Court is here. This is the trend: Appellate courts are not permitting “John Doe” defamation actions to be their own justification. These rulings prevent plaintiffs to merely file a flimsy complaint and get quick discovery from ISP’s so plaintiffs can learn the identity of bloggers and others on the Internet who are virtually never actually committing legally actionable defamation — but who are critics the plaintiff would like identified.

Courts are not making it impossible for bona fide plaintiffs to get discovery to which they’re normally entitled. But igot-gouzenko-hoodedthey are requiring, in cases like these, that plaintiffs make a legal showing of their bona fides up front,which is eminently reasonable considering how meritless most defamation actions are.

It doesn’t do me, as a defendant, any good to win a motion to dismiss if the main thing you, as a plaintiff and the subject of my criticism, already have what you want — my identity — and are now free to get me fired, cut off from my suppliers, or shunned, as the case may be. It also removes some of the burden on defendants, who are usually financially worse off in these situations, from having to hire attorneys to quash subpoenas served on ISP’s, much less to make appearances on behalf of anonymous parties. This is a good trend.

UPDATE: More, similar news from California.

Jews for Jesus v. Google and Brodsky – update and analysis

Originally posted 2006-01-22 12:59:35. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Jews for Jesus

I was on a panel called “Trademark Rights vs. Free Speech” at the Fall 2000 INTA Trademarks in Cyberspace Conference with Marty Schwimmer and David Bernstein. (Five years later I’m still glowing from the reflected brilliance!) The moderator was IP superstar Brendan O’Rourke, who cruelly, on-the-record, and correctly reminded me, “Ron, you lost the Jews for Jesus case, okay? Okay?” Yeah, well, okay. But that doesn’t mean the next guy–in this case, Google–has to! The “Jews for Jesus Whistle Blower” writes, at his Jews for Jesus blog:

Google has a few more days to respond to Jews for Jesus’ lawsuit over the rights to a blog. I bet Jews for Jesus is praying ferverently (and keeping their collective fingers crossed) that Google will give in. What is the likelihood that Google will set a precedent that all anyone has to do is sue Google and they’ll give in? Seems to me that Google is principled. And if they are willing to defend themselves against the government, there’s a good chance they’ll defend themselves against Jews for Jesus.

If Google doesn’t give in, will Jews for Jesus wilt? How much money do they have to pursue the control of a simple blog?

WB, they have plenty of money, and, as you cannily point out, they’re using this litigation to raise more. Jews for Jesus claimed (off the record) during the Brodsky litigation to have raised more in sympathetic donations than they spent on Thelen Reid’s legal fees. We’ll never know if that was true, but it’s food for thought.

As far as the “other side” went, although Steve Brodsky was the sole defendant and there was nothing but the most casual (well, and virtual) link between him and Rabbi Toviah Singer, certainly the two were aligned sympathetically. Rabbi Singer later told me that as a result of the controversy and the traffic that was generated as a result of the publicity for his website, a number of Messianic Jews (i.e., Christians with gefilte fish) returned to the Jewish fold. Maybe he was able to raise a dollar or too himself.

It is fair enough to say that the litigation was more helpful for J4J than it was for either Steve Brodsky, Rabbi singer or anti-J4J missionaries. The real loser, of course, was the law of trademark infringement, which still has not fully recovered. The most egregious aspect of J4J’s arguments on this point (as opposed to the even worse arguments–such as the cooked up “commercial use”–in the opinion) is the very premise that there is, with respect to these website cases, anything even approximating LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION.

As we put it in the Third Circuit brief which, among others, future Supreme Court justice Samuel Alito by all indications did not read (although he was on the panel that rubber-stamped the District Court decision with one sentence of affirmation):

Liability under the Lanham Act requires a showing, inter alia, of likelihood of confusion as to source. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978). But, appellee has submitted no admissible proof to support a finding that confusion is likely.
. . .

[I]t takes virtually no time for even self-described “unsophisticated” users to quickly realize they are at Mr. Brodsky’s site, not that of appellee. The honesty of the non-confusing message on Mr. Brodsky’s website is in stark contrast to the defendant’s website in Planned Parenthood:

Because the words on the top of the page load first, the user is first greeted solely with the “Welcome to the Planned Parenthood Page!” It is highly likely that an Internet user will still believe that she has found plaintiff’s web site at that point.

42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1438. That kind of confusion is simply impossible in the case of Mr. Brodsky’s website . . . In response to this argument, the District Court found that an individual may be a sophisticated consumer of the Internet but may be an unsophisticated consumer of information about religious organizations. Such a user may find his or her way to the Defendant Internet site and then be confused; the Defendant Internet site advocates views antithetical to those of the Plaintiff Organization.

The last two clauses in the excerpt above constitute a non-sequitur. They also make no sense in the context of the actual website at issue, which explicitly states its opposition to “the Jews for Jesus cult” and disclaims any affiliation with appellee. Concluding that Mr. Brodsky is not part of a Jews for Jesus organization does not require any particular “sophistication.” It only requires the ability to read.

In fact, the courts routinely define “sophistication” in much less “sophisticated” terms than did the court below, where a simple grasp of the obvious is all that is required to negate confusion. Thus, in Girls Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court ruled that “rational analysis” precluded confusion about whether the Girl Scouts were the source of a poster depicting a pregnant girl in the well-known uniform of the Girl Scouts appearing with the caveat “BE PREPARED.” Similarly, in Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, supra, 489 F. Supp. at 1123, a poster reading “Stop the Olympic Prison” was held not to violate the trademark of the United States Olympic Committee. The court reasoned as follows:

On the basis of its own examination of the poster, the Court finds it extremely unlikely that anyone would presume it to have been produced, sponsored or in any way authorized by the U.S.O.C. While at a fleeting glance, someone might conceivably mistake it for a poster advertising the Olympics, nobody could conceivably retain such a misconception long enough to do any harm: for example, there is no danger that anyone would purchase or display it as such.

Id. . . .  As in Girl Scouts and Olympic Prison, no rational person could believe that Mr. Brodsky’s message was in any way affiliated with appellee. The District Court nonetheless held that confusion is likely because Mr. Brodsky’s site is “related” to that of appellee [and that the use of the trademark was in fact more, not less, protected for this reason, on fair use grounds!-- RDC]. The court below inexplicably rejected the inescapable conclusion that consumers can dispel any confusion if they merely trouble to read Mr. Brodsky’s message, the way Chellathurai, Kalstein and Sanchez did.

If you’re still with me, here’s a last nail from the Third Circuit reply brief:

In defending the District Court’s likelihood of confusion analysis, appellee comes again to its prized exhibits: the three “confusion affidavits” of Chellathurai, Kalstein and Sanchez. There is little left to debate regarding whether these affidavits demonstrate confusion, or, more likely, the absence of confusion. This Court will simply have to read them. A076, A080, A257. Appellee suggests that the District Court found “initial interest confusion” here. Opp. Brief. at 37. But this doctrine is mentioned nowhere in the opinion below. Developed in a sales context, it has been applied only where “a potential purchaser is initially confused [such that] the [senior seller] may be precluded from further consideration.”

Weiss Assoc., Inc. v. HRL Assoc., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Thus it does not apply here. In fact, in Girl Scouts the Southern District of New York rejected transient confusion as proof of trademark harm in a social-commentary context:

Even if we hypothesize that some viewers might at first believe that the subject of the poster is actually a pregnant Girl Scout, it is highly doubtful that any such impression would be more than momentary or that any viewer would conclude that the Girl Scouts had printed or distributed the poster.

304 F. Supp. at 1231. As the Girl Scouts court recognized, ephemeral moments of confusion that do not threaten to divert sales are not evidence of actionable harm under the Lanham Act. Real harm must be shown to overcome the constitutional protection of free speech:

No evidence is found anywhere in the record before the court that the poster has to date damaged the plaintiff in any way. No facts are presented to show that contributions to the organization have fallen off, that members have resigned, that recruits have failed to join, that sales . . . have decreased, or that voluntary workers have dissociated themselves or declined to support the honorable work of the organization.

Id. at 1235. Similarly, there is no evidence in this case of any actionable or even discernible harm that appellee has suffered as a result of Mr. Brodsky’s website. Even the court below admitted that the publicity surrounding this dispute was, far from harmful, undoubtedly a boon for appellee. A436-37. And all three supposedly confused affiants found their way to appellee’s website, undeterred by Steven Brodsky and more zealous than ever in their devotion to appellee. In fact, their reports to appellee negate the suggestion of confusion; again from Girl Scouts:

[I]ndignation is not confusion. To the contrary, the indignation of those who [reported the offending use] would appear to make it clear that they feel that the Girl Scouts are being unfairly put upon, not that the Girl Scouts are the manufacturers or distributors of the object of indignation.

Id. at 1231. This passage perfectly describes the three “confusion” affidavits here: indignant, yes, but certain that appellee was not the source of Mr. Brodsky’s website. They were not confused.

They were not confused. Unfortunately, a lot of people were, and are–about what the Lanham Act is, and is not, meant to protect, and don’t get this key point:  Indignation is not confusion. We can survive that, as long as too many of them aren’t judges.

It’s a good bet, as Whistle Blower suggests, that Google will get a better hearing than lone idealist Steve Brodsky did in his case, and not just because it is better heeled. (My old firm, Pitney Hardin, handled the Brodsky litigation pro bono.) And the issues are somewhat different.

Still, Whistle Blower says that the Reverend David Brickner, the pleasant, non-Jewish head of Jews for Jesus, thinks this is the second coming of the Brodsky case. Jews for Jesus attorneys Thelen Reid probably hope so (though perhaps not every Thelen Ried partner is singing from the same sheet of music on the topic of God and intellectual property). WB beleives that from a legal point of view this seems like somewhat wishful thinking. (Not to mention the fact that this case was filed in the federal court in New York, not New Jersey, and that Judge Lechner of the former court has retired and moved onto bigger and better things.)

Then again, the Rev. Brickner’s statement is hardly the first instance of wishful confusion to eminate from the the precincts of Jews for Jesus–not hardly.